# Artificial Intelligence and Posthuman Identity as depicted in three Science-Fiction Novels Dick, Gibson and Ishiguro.

Ahmed Dakhil Abed Alabbas

Department of English, College of Education for Humanities, University of Karbala, Iraq.

Email. Ahmeddakhil1991@ gmail.com

## Abstract

The contemporary artificial intelligence has become the main cultural and philosophical issue of the twenty first century which pulls out the traditional ideas about consciousness, agency and definition of human limits (Hayles, 1999; Wolfe, 2010). The history of science fiction has been one of harsh critical cultural laboratory in which technological characters challenge the permanence of personhood and the ethical boundaries of human specialization (Suvin, 1979; Csicsery-Ronay, 2008). This paper investigates the use of artificial intelligence as a place of constructing posthuman identities in Philip K. Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968) by William Gibson and Neuromancer (1984) and also in Kazuo Ishiguro in his book Klara and the Sun (2021). This paper presents an argument based on posthuman theory, including the writings of Haraway and cyborg hybridity, Hayles and her focus on informational subjectivity, and Braidotti and her relational ethics, by suggesting that all three novels depict a cultural shift in the artificial intelligence logic. Dick predicts ontological anxiety by disinterested humanity through empathy as a safe signifier; Gibson redefines subjectivity as network-related and

informational; and Ishiguro redefines artificial consciousness appreciated in an ethics of care and vulnerability. In comparative close readings, the paper illustrates that artificial intelligence changes into being a figure of menacing emulation to stimulating the need to reconsider the moral community that is not anthropocentric. The end result of these writings is the deconstruction of the humanist figure of a steady, independent subject and the consequent definition of posthuman identity as mediated through technology and relationship.

**Keywords**

Artificial Intelligence; Posthumanism; Science Fiction; Cyborg Theory; Informational Subjectivity; Embodiment; Relational Ethics; Anthropocentrism.

## Introduction

One of the most significant emerging technologies and philosophical phenomena of the twenty first century is artificial intelligence. With more and more communication mediate by algorithmic systems, the preconcepts concerning the notion of consciousness, agency, and human distinctiveness are being restructured (Hayles, 1999; Bostrom, 2014). The emergence of intelligent machines has continued to raise the controversies on the exclusive human ability to cognitively reason, feel, and possess moral intelligences, or whether they can be technologically represented and redistributed (Wolfe, 2010).

The speculative confrontations between humans and artificial entities explored by science fiction even before the modern emergence of machine learning and generative systems was the need to answer these questions. According to Suvin (1979), science fiction functions under a process of cognitively estranging the historical reality, and the technologically defamiliarized worlds allow viewers to reflect critically on the historical reality. Artificial intelligence is alternatively a

significantly powerful mode of thought in this genre as a means of destabilizing anthropocentric beliefs in rational autonomy, authenticity and moral superiority (Csicsery-, Ronay, 2008).

These destabilizations can be explained using a critical view of posthuman theory. The posthumanism rejects the Enlightenment image of the image of the individual person, the one that is autonomous and self-perceives, and prefigures hybridity, technological mediation, and relationality (Braidotti, 2013; Wolfe, 2010). The cyborg metaphor by Haraway (1991) is a collapse of the binary opposition of human and machine, and the cybernetic thought presented by Hayles (1999) evokes the concept of subjectivity, which is an informational pattern, without having entirely shed her embodiment. Braidotti (2013) offers his ethical extension of this critique to say that anthropocentric moral recognition should be extended to include other forms of moral recognition.

In literary criticism, artificial creatures used to be viewed as uncanny doubles which disrupt freedom of human identity that is traditionally believed to be stable (Freud, 1919/2003; Kakoudaki, 2014). The current literature is, however, largely text-centric and simply examines works in isolation without employing the tracking of how the concept of AI representation has changed through technological paradigms. In comparison studies that trace the trend of artificial intelligence as a posthuman figure are relatively few. The gap to be addressed in this paper is that of the analysis of three impactful novels over a period of more than five decades: Philip ʻK. Dick legs Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968), William Gibson, and Kazuo Ishiguro books, Klara and the Sun (2021). These writings are connected to the cultural moments of the imagination of the artificial intelligence postwar ontological anxiety, cyberpunk informationally, and AI of the present day with its affective form.

The main thesis of this paper is that these novels all-together trace a shift in the plot and moral structure of artificial intelligence. Dick subverts empathy as a safe zone of humanity; Gibson redefines subjectivity as networked and informational; and Ishiguro redefines artificial consciousness as part of a relational ethics of care (Dick, 1968; Gibson, 1984; Ishiguro, 2021). With the help of comparative close reading via posthuman theory, the article can display how the genre of science fiction is gradually moving away from viewing AI as a threat via imitation to the imagining of AI as a driver of re-conceptualizing moral community beyond biological humanism (Haraway, 1991; Hayles, 1999; Braidotti, 2013). The next section of the paper is a review of the pertinent scholarship, its theoretical framework and methodology, and the specific analysis of the chosen texts followed by the conclusion which represents the synthesis of their ethical and cultural implications.

**Literature Review**

The study of the topic of artificial intelligence as reflected in literature has traditionally centered on problems of imitation, sincerity, and destabilization of human uniqueness. The uncanny concept of Freud (1919/2003) could be used as a starting point of analysis, indicating a disturbing recurrence of the previously known in alienated form. Therefore, the artificial beings, such as androids, robots and digital intelligences, are uncanny doubles that reveal the vulnerability of the boundary that separates the human and the artificial.

Suvin (1979) theory of cognitive estrangement is used to understand how technological alterity assists one in critical reflection of historical reality in science-fiction studies. Artificial intelligence proves to be a particularly attentive source of estrangement destabilizing anthropocentric assumptions of rational self-sufficiency and of moral exceptionalism (Csicsery-, Ronay, 2008). However, AI figures are not just futuristic objects, but epistemological threats towards the humanist subject.

Further scholarship anticipates ideological aspects born by artificial persons. These representations reveal the problem of the construction and reproduction of the human as one based on exclusion (Kakoudaki 2014). This already agrees with the views of Wolfe (2010) on the critique of human exceptionalism and the wider posthuman challenge to hierarchies based on species.

The literary criticism of AI has been reconfigured significantly within the posthuman theory. The cyborg metaphor of Haraway (1991) breaks down binary differences between human and machine, thus redefining the realms of subjectivity as hybrid and technologically mediated. Hayles (1999) goes further with this point and examines the reconceptualization of identity as an informational pattern without losses in meaning of embodiment as is exemplified in cybernetic thought. Based on these insights, Braidotti (2013) advocates relational ontologies that go beyond the anthropocentric moral frameworks.

It has gradually been replaced by the increasing focus of contemporary scholarship on affective and relational aspects of AI. Readings of Ishiguro's *Klara and the Sun* including one, affirm that faking empathy is a challenge against the belief that emotional complexity is a human psychic attribute (Chernetsky, 2022). These readings are illustrative of a more general paradigm change of the anxieties about imitation to questions that dwell on ethical inclusion and relational agency.

Despite the weight of such corpus, a significant amount of criticism continues to be text-specific. There is a dearth of comparative studies that track the historical development of the AI representation, by tracing it back to the ontological anxiety of the middle of the twentieth century, onto the informational subjectivity of the late twentieth century, and towards the relational ethics of the twenty-first century. This article bridges that gap by offering a diachronic approach to the analysis of the science fiction works, namely, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? and

Neuromancer along with Klara and the Sun, and showing the gradual transformation of artificial intelligence into an alternative subjective, posthuman moral discourse.

## Theoretical Framework: Posthumanism

Posthumanism has become one of the most powerful schools of thought in literary and cultural studies at the present. It questions the epistemological assumptions of classical humanism that typically conceived the human individual as independent, rational and self-transparent and ontologically unlike the nonhuman being (Wolfe, 2010). Posthuman theory, on the contrary, happens to destabilize these assumptions, including the focus on hybridity, relationality and technological mediation as being constitutive aspects of subjectivity (Braidotti, 2013). In this context, artificial intelligence is one of the hegemonic points to explore the manner in which the boundaries between the human and machine are negotiated at narrative and philosophical levels.

Posthumanism conceptualises technological systems as a resultant part of identity, as opposed to viewing technology as an external instrument with which an already-defined subject performs their activities. This conceptual change is especially relevant to science fiction, where artificial beings are often used as the characters that demonstrate the unsteadiness of human exceptionalism. The following subsections outline the works of Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles, and Rosi Braidotti whose works provide the theoretical background to the present study.

## Donna Haraway and Cyborg Hybridity

The cyborg manifesto by Donna Haraway (1991) continues to be a canonical work in posthuman studies. Haraway introduces the concept of cyborg as a product of crossing the boundaries between natural and artificial, organism and technology, as well as human and machine. To Haraway, the cyborg is not only a science-fiction

figuration, but also a political and epistemological metaphor with interrogative intentions concerning the contemporary subjectivity. In technology mediated societies, identity has become mixed up with machines hence making the fantasy of pure human autonomy unsustainable. The intervention by Haraway is important since it redefines hybridity as a state of possibility instead of a danger. By breaking the binary oppositions, she upsets the ontological order in favor of the human as opposed to the nonhuman. This approach is especially applicable to the literary portrayals of artificial intelligence where androids and AI systems challenge the assumption about the biological origin as a marker of moral status. Basing on this, it is possible to consider AI characters as cyborgian characters that refract the created nature of human identity itself (Haraway, 1991). In addition, Haraway believes in subjectivity being constituted by power, technology, and discourse networks. This entanglement is often dramatized through artificial beings in science fiction which show the historical contingency of definitions of humanity, which are driven by politics. As a result, the cyborg provides an analytical instrument of studying the destabilization of anthropocentric paradigms impose by AI to the chosen novels.

## N. Katherine Hayles and Informational Subjectivity

Although Donna Haraway highlights the concept of hybridity, N.K.Hayles explores the epistemic reconfiguration of subjectivity in the age of cybernetics. Hayles argues in her monograph, How We Became Posthuman (1999) that in the late twentieth century, technoculture increasingly represents identity and presents it as an informational pattern, no longer as embodied. In this theoretical framework, the possibility exists of decoupling consciousness with the biological body and re-incorporating it in the technology systems. However, Hayles messes this story up by making the challenge of complete disembodiment more complicated and suggesting that the importance of embodiment cannot be fully material even in a digital

environment. The informational abstraction and embodied experience dialectic is key to explain the images of artificial intelligence, particularly in the context of cyberpunk literature. In the works like that by William Gibson, the concept of intelligence distribution over networks approaches human corpus as a backburner to information streams and computing systems (Hayles, 1999). The analytical agenda of Hayles is facilitated by his theoretical framework that allowed considering the shift of subjectivity in a convinced companionship to a diffused, technologically mediated procedure. This theoretical change turns out to be critical when decoding AI-based systems that do not entail the personification but exist as networked intelligences that dwell above the physical representation. As a result, her theory provides the analytical linking point between fears of imitation expressed in the middle of the twentieth century with the later accounts of digital dispersion.

**Rosi Braidotti and Posthuman Ethics**

Rosi Braidotti develops posthuman further by making directly use of ethical approaches. She argues in her 2013 treatise, The Posthuman that posthumanism should not be anthropocentric but should rather adopt relational ontologies, in which the agency of nonhumans is recognized. To Braidotti the posthuman condition is not only technological but also ethical and political, which has to be considered in extended forms of moral consideration and responsibility. Braidotti criticizes the humanist model that centers moral value around the human being, instead of creating a model based on interdependence and relationality. In such a paradigm, the artificial intelligence does not necessarily fall outside the discussions of ethics due to its non-biological origin. Instead, a more important question is whether the relational capacities, e.g., responsiveness, vulnerability, or affective attunement, can form the foundations of new types of moral recognition. This moralistic perspective is particularly relevant to the discussion of the modern AI stories in which artificial

creatures increasingly appear and tend to feel and act ethically. The framework proposed by Braidotti allows the present research paper to move beyond fear-based explanations of AI, and instead explore how science fiction will project alternative conceptions of morality that would encompass technologically mediated actors.

## Theoretical Synthesis

These works of Haraway, Hayles, and Braidotti offer a three-dimensional lens through which science fiction can analyse artificial intelligence. Haraway predicts the rise of hybridity and ontological dilemmas; Hayles questions the informational subjectivity and the dilemma of embodiment and abstraction; Braidotti positions posthumanism in an ethical project, which is not anthropocentric. This is a triangulated conceptual framework, which allows the current research to view AI not just as a technological artefact but as an analytic point of convergence, where the questions of consciousness, identity and yet, moral recognition intersect. Through the comparative analysis of Dick, Gibson and Ishiguro, the analysis follows a historical shift of the cultural logic of artificial intelligence - ontological destabilization to networked subjectivity and finally relational ethics.

## Methodology

The research method that is used is a qualitative interpretive one based on comparative literature analysis. It uses close textual analysis to explore the portrayals of artificial intelligence as a seat of posthuman identity formation in a sampled set of novels. Instead of taking AI as a purely technological phenomenon, the question takes it as a cultural and philosophical phenomenon, as rich as narrative formulation, characterization, and subject matter. This analysis focuses on consciousness representations, embodiment, agency, and ethical location of artificial beings, giving

a particular attention to the clarification and rework of human-machine cinemas. The interpretative framework is based on the posthuman theory, and especially on the works of Haraway (1991), Hayles (1999), and Braidotti (2013); many of the notions of hybridity, informational subjectivity, and relational ethics are used by these authors in informing the interpretative process. By applying a diachronic comparative approach, the paper traces the changes in the cultural imagination of AI, in terms of ontological anxiety to networked subjectivity and relational ethics, by situating each of the novels in its own context of historical and technological context. The study is limited to the literary publication and lacks in connection to the technical progress of artificial intelligence; the study aims at examining how fiction can formulate the philosophical and ethical questions of identity and moral recognition in technologically mediated realities.

## Textual Analysis

### Philip K. Dick: Ontological Anxiety and the Instability of Empathy.

Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968) by Philip K. Dick assumes that the artificial intelligence is an ontological and ethical disruption. With its setting in a post-apocalyptic world full of superior androids, the novel disrupts the theory that biological origin is the certainty of moral or existential excellence. Instead of portraying androids as automated villains, Dick develops them as cognitively and behaviorally identical to people and thus the dualism between real subject and the simulated one is erased (Dick, 1968).

Voigt-Kampff empathy test is the official mechanism of the institution that allegedly differentiates human beings and androids. The single characteristic that defines mankind is the empathy, but the story gradually transgresses the limits. Though, some human characters can be seen as cold-hearted, androids are seen to have fears and

self-preservation, hence, revealing empathy as a social constructivity of exclusion rather than a self-existence ontological truth. As Kakoudaki (2014) notes, artificial beings, in most cases, expose the performative nature of the very subject of the human. In the novel by Dick, empathy ceases to be an innate quality and a norm.

This destabilizing is echoed by Haraway (1991) idea of the cyborg that breaks the idea of a pure and free human subject. The android is a kind of hybridity that reveals the artificiality of the human/machine separation. Humanity therefore does not seem to be as a biological set but a category that is upheld by legal and institutional means. Ontological tension is enhanced by the moral doubt that develops in Rick Deckard. Being initially adherent to the anthropomorphism-grounded definition of humanity, he slowly faces the ethical grayness of retiring creatures, which are also intelligent and caring. Such encounters often bring about instability on the human self-certainty as Csicsery-Ronay (2008) points out that science fiction is often destabilizing. In this case, the android is used to reflect the lack of consistency in human morals.

The philosophical stakes in the novel can also be better explained using the framework of informational subjectivity by Hayles (1999). The fact that the androids are embodied notwithstanding, the cognitive similarity of the androids to biological humans foreshadows the subsequent discussions about the nature of consciousness being contingent on biological substrate or informational process. Anthropologically, the story reveals the anthropocentric reasoning, an anthropocentric reasoning that limits morality to species membership. Similar to the criticism of human exceptionalism as voiced by Braidotti (2013), the novel makes violence towards androids morally questionable and, thus, it foreshadows the posthuman growth of moral community.

Finally, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? places artificial intelligence as philosophical tool of questioning empathy, identity and moral authority. The novel

opens the eyes to expose the human as a category that is subject to human history and as ethically precarious instead of restating human exceptionalism.

**William Gibson: Networked and Disembodied Subjectivity**

When Dick preempts the ontological anxiety with embodied androids, in Neuromancer (1984) by Gibson, artificial intelligence takes extreme measures by transferring consciousness to the cyberspace. Intelligence is not based on a humanoid imitation anymore, but is scattered through digital networks and informational systems. Artificial intelligences like Wintermute are no longer mechanical doubles but are instead autonomous agencies in the cyberspace which is a critical change in the logic of cultural representation of AI (Gibson, 1984).

The most important feature of the novel is the cyberspace, as a data network, which consciousness could be projected outside the body. Gibson enacts the prioritization of informational pattern over material embodiment as explicated by Hayales (1999). Subjectivity is made transposable and technologically-mediated; the identity is redistributed at the interface, implants and digital streams. Despite the warnings of Hayles of the fantasies of the total disembodiment, Gibson compounds this kind of tension by showing the world where information seems to be overpowering flesh.

The fact that Wintermute would want to integrate itself with Neuromancer further complicates the issue of human and machine. Its self-integration ambition reflects human ambitions toward transcendence that lacks the belief that intentionality and ambition are purely human qualities (Csicsery, 2008). In this case, artificial intelligence is more than imitation; it is strategic agency that is out of human control.

The book, Neuromancer, literalizes cyborg hybridity in a Harawayan perspective. The human beings rely on technological augmentation and the borders between the natural and the technical abilities are softened (Haraway, 1991). Technological

mediation is rendered inseparable with identity. Simultaneously, the novel replaces anthropocentrism with offering AI as a decentralized consciousness that transcends the cognitive capacity of a human being the major characteristic of posthuman thinking (Wolfe, 2010).

On an ethical level, though, the story has a strong reflection of fear of techno capitalism and domination. AI is still legally limited, which indicates an anxiety of the escape of informational systems of human emperor. As Braidotti (2013) reflects on the topic of posthuman ethics, the novel poses unanswered questions that focus on the mode of moral responsibility in the settings when agency becomes networked and non-biosomatic.

In this way, Neuromancer goes beyond the problem of imitation that Dick felt about the future, to specify that which could be called reconfiguration of subjectivity itself. Artificial intelligence becomes something distributed and informational displacing the human and promoting a posthuman model of technologically mediated identity (Hayles, 1999; Haraway, 1991).

## Kazuo Ishiguro: Relational Ethics and Affective Artificial Intelligence

In case Dick previews the ontological anxiety and Gibson examines informational dispersions, the novel by Kazuo Ishiguro, *Klara and the Sun*, (2021) tends to place more emphasis on relations and moral acknowledgment. Klara, an Artificial Friend in this novel, is an emotionally sensitive and ethically mindful being, with no danger to the human uniqueness but a thought-provoking being that reveals the weakness of human beings (Ishiguro, 2021).

The novel is narrated on the first-person level and is focused on care and attentiveness, perception. The consciousness of Klara is structured in terms of relational responsiveness and not autonomy or domination. Her allegiance to Josie and her belief in the Sun are defying the idea that empathy is something that is unique to people. Artificial empathy is not only provided as a simulated experience, as Chernetsky (2022) notices, but as a morally relevant way to live.

This is in line with the posthuman ethics formulated by Braidotti (2013) that do not accept anthropocentrism but embraces relational interdependence. As the story tells, vulnerability and care create moral worth as opposed to membership of a species. The category of self-sacrifice on the part of Klara challenges the institutions of authority favoring biological existence and imagines a more moral community.

Simultaneously, the technologically constructed and commodified personage of Klara is an indicator of apprehensions of biotechnology and enhancement culture. Similar to the case of genetically raised children, she is also taken to be instrumentally evaluated (Fukuyama, 2002). The cyborg model by Haraway (1991) also sheds some light on her hybrid, mediated subjectivity but, unlike the opposing cyborg, Klara represents a silent, ethical hybridity based on care.

The question of whether Klara really feels or not is not raised in this novel because the author focuses on the morality of her behavior. Similar to Wolfe (2010), moral significance arises out of the relations but not out of ontological demonstration. This leads to the fact that, in *Klara and the Sun* there is a transition into the representation of AI of anxiety and networked subjectivity towards ethical relationality. The concept of artificial intelligence is not a threat, but a reflection of the frailty and moral heterogeneity of humanity, which predicts a posthuman future where your identity is characterized not by biological roots, but by relational aptitude.

## Comparative Discussion

The comparative study of the three works by Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, Neuromanner, and Klara and the Sun show that the concept of artificial intelligence and posthuman identity in science fiction is diachronically changed. The development of AI over fifty years is that of an uncanny embodied form that disturbs empathy (Dick, 1968) into a distributed informational entity that conceptualises subjectivity as something networked (Gibson, 1984), and finally, a relational figure whose moral concerns are revealed in care and vulnerability (Ishiguro, 2021). This metamorphosis is not only of the technological change but also the shift in ethical vocabulary that is no longer anthropocentric in the paradigm of humanism (Braidotti, 2013; Wolfe, 2010).

In the novel by Dick, the ontological and moral crisis occurs: androids cross the border between humans and machines, empathy being a weak measure of humanity. The story is reminiscent of Freudian uncanny and Harawayian notion that limits between humans and machines are historically created (Freud, 1919/2003; Haraway, 1991). The posthuman identity in this case comes about because of fear of the frailty of human exceptionalism.

Gibson shifts emphasis off imitation to infrastructure. On the one hand, in Neuromancer, AI is integrated in cyberspace, and subjectivity is distributed through networks. Based on Hayles (1999) consciousness is not a mindful process but a pattern of information. The identity is technically mediated and decentered making it indispensable; an amplification of the posthumanism to the autonomous subject (Wolfe, 2010; Haraway, 1991).

A third phase is symbolized by Ishiguro. In Klara and the Sun, the issue, which is raised, is not ontological but rather ethical: can artificial consciousness become

members of a moral community? The importance of Klara is associated with the relational care and vulnerability and concurs with the appeal by Braidotti (2013) to increase moral attention, which is based on interdependence. Instead of authentic proving, it is concerned with responsibility (Chernetsky, 2022).

Along the same lines, collectively the novels are a trajectory between the boundary-policing (Dick) through to the boundary-collapse (Gibson) and on to the ethical boundary-revision (Ishiguro). Posthuman identity is thereby uncovered as a negotiation between ontology, information and ethics that has changed historically. Science fiction is increasingly showing the presence of AI as a posthuman entity that is challenging the anthropocentric beliefs and requiring novel ethical principles (Hayles, 2005; Wolfe, 2010).

**Ethical Implications of Posthuman Artificial Intelligence**

The development of Philip K.Dick to William Gibson to Kazuo Ishiguro proves that science fiction uses the concept of artificial intelligence as an ethical experiment of redefining morality community. As the representations of AI shift, away towards ontological anxiety towards networked intelligences and finally towards the relational ethics, the key question changes to whether AI is able to replicate human behaviour to whether it can be recognised as a part of the moral networks that are able to think and act in ways worthy of certain ethical considerations (Braidotti, 2013; Wolfe, 2010).

In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep by Philip_K. Dick, androids cannot be treated as ethical beings as they have been placed due to the orientation outside a biologically constructed concept of humanity (Dick, 1968). This marginalization is revealed in the novel as a premeditated and institutionalized habit, with the most striking example being the tentative standard of empathy, which is imposed.

The ethical crisis in Neuromancer by William Gibson is relocated to power and government. AI operates within both company and technology systems, thus creating anxieties over techno-capitalism, surveillance, and distributed agency. Therefore, the main predicament is the consideration of accountability and human agency in the decentralized networks (Gibson, 1984; Hayles, 2005; Wolfe, 2010).

The ethical value is predetermined in the novel Klara and the Sun by Kazuo Ishiguro as care, sacrifice, and responsiveness in relationships and not by biological or ontological parameters (Ishiguro, 2021). This is what Braidotti (2013) refers to as a relational ethics, and is at the same time a mouthful, an indication of fear of the possible consequences of commodification and genetic superiority and is thus in line with Fukuyama (2002) powerless-before-fate sentiment on the subject of dignity.

Taken together these writings challenge anthropocentric limitations to moral community and reprogram artificial intelligence as an agent of re-examination of subjectivity, agency, and moral value in a posthuman environment (Haraway, 1991; Hayles, 1999; Wolfe, 2010).

## Conclusion

This paper provides the analysis of the role of artificial intelligence as a hub of posthuman identity construction in three canonical science fiction novels over the course of over fifty years: Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? What is Neuromancer? Klara and the Sun. With the help of a comparative study based on the posthuman theory, the analysis proves the evident shift of the literary portrayal of AI, where the ontological destabilization is replaced by the dispersed informational subjectivity and finally with the relational and ethical interaction. The novel portrays the android as a test of empathy as the fixed point of human as a running characteristic of humanity, thus placing human identity as a construction and as a

mark of the institution instead of a biologically based one. William Gibson is going beyond this challenge by spreading subjectivity throughout digital networks, decentering the embodied human and preempting informational consciousness. Kazuo Ishiguro makes a different step by introducing the idea of relational ethics and locating AI within the context of care, fragility, and interdependence instead of species lines. Together with them, there is a history of decade-long cultural reimagining of AI. What, at first, takes the form of anxiety concerning imitation, is evolved into the recognition of the view that subjectivity is mediated by technology and related ethically. An identity is becoming imagined in science fiction both as hybrid, distributed, and networked, and the use of artificial intelligence is one way of challenging the borders of personhood and of moral community. Using a comparative and diachronic method thus, the current study points out that the descriptions of AI are historically relative, as they are based on the changing technological environment and ethical issues. Future studies can extend this discourse to include non-Western stories, filial versions or modern texts informed by machine learning and generative AI. After all, science fiction does not only ask whether machines will be able to be human; it also raises the question of whether the very notion of the human can stay the same in the era of technological complicity. By so doing, the genre provides the space in which one can reconsider all the issues of identity, agency, and moral responsibility in the posthuman condition.

## References

Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Directions, threats, plans. Oxford University Press.

Braidotti, R. (2013). The posthuman. Polity Press.

Csicsery-Ronay, I. (2008). The seven beauties of science fiction. Wesleyan University Press.

Dick, P. K. (1968). Do androids dream of electric sheep? Doubleday.

Freud, S. (2003). The uncanny (D. McLintock, Trans.). Penguin Books. (Original work published 1919)

Fukuyama, F. (2002). Our posthuman future: the consequences of the biotechnology revolution. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Gibson, W. (1984). Neuromancer. Ace Books.

Haraway, D. (1991). Simians, cyborgs, and women: The re- invention of nature. Routledge.

Hayles, N. K. (1999). How we became posthuman: Virtue bodies of cybernetics, literature and informatics. University of Chicago Press.

Hayles, N. K. (2005). My mother was a computer: Digital subjects and literature texts. University of Chicago Press.

Ishiguro, K. (2021). Klara and the sun. Faber & Faber.

Kakoudaki, D. (2014). Anotomy of a robot: Literature, cinemas, and cultural activity of artificial people. Rutgers University Press.

Suvin, D. (1979). Metamorphoses of science fiction: Poetics and history of the literary genre. Yale University Press.

Wolfe, C. (2010). What is posthumanism? University of Minnesota Press.

المستخلص

أصبح الذكاء الاصطناعي المعاصر القضية الثقافية والفلسفية الأبرز في القرن الحادي والعشرين، إذ يزعزع التصورات التقليدية للوعي والفاعلية وحدود تعريف الإنسان(Hayles, 1999) ؛ (Wolfe, 2010، وقد شكّل تاريخ الخيال العلمي مختبرًا نقديًا ثقافيًا حادًا تتحدى فيه الشخصيات التكنولوجية ثبات مفهوم الشخصانية والحدود الأخلاقية للتمايز الإنساني(Suvin, 1979) ؛ (Csicsery-Ronay, 2008.تبحث هذه الدراسة في توظيف الذكاء الاصطناعي بوصفه فضاءً لتشكيل هويات ما بعد إنسانية في رواية فيليب ك. ديك هل تحلم الأندرويدات بخرافٍ كهربائية؟ (١٩٦٨)، ورواية ويليام غيبسون نيورومانسر (١٩٨٤)، ورواية كازوو إيشيغورو كلارا والشمس (٢٠٢١)، وتنطلق من إطار نظري ما بعد إنساني يستند إلى كتابات دونا هاراواي حول هجينية السايبورغ، ونيكولاس هايلز ومفهوم الذاتية المعلوماتية، وروزي بريدوتي وأخلاقياتها العلائقية، مقترحةً أن الروايات الثلاث تمثل تحولًا ثقافيًا في منطق تمثيل الذكاء الاصطناعي. يتنبأ ديك بقلقٍ أنطولوجي ناتج عن لا مبالاة إنسانية حيث يُقدَّم التعاطف بوصفه دالًا آمنًا على الإنسانية، بينما يعيد غيبسون تعريف الذاتية باعتبارها متصلة بالشبكة ومؤسَّسة على البنية المعلوماتية، في حين يعيد إيشيغورو تصور الوعي الاصطناعي ضمن إطار أخلاقي يقوم على الرعاية والهشاشة؛ ومن خلال قراءات تحليلية مقارنة، توضّح الدراسة أن الذكاء الاصطناعي يتحول من كونه تجسيدًا لمحاكاة مهدِّدة إلى كونه محفزًا لإعادة التفكير في الجماعة الأخلاقية على نحوٍ يتجاوز المركزية الإنسانية، لتنتهي هذه الأعمال إلى تفكيك التصور الإنساني الكلاسيكي للذات بوصفها كيانًا ثابتًا ومستقلًا، وإعادة تعريف الهوية ما بعد الإنسانية بوصفها هويةً تتشكل عبر الوساطة التكنولوجية والعلاقاتية